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Fiscal Paternalism A Policy for the
and New England Year 2000
Cities:
Mark S. Ferber and Elizabeth A. Ferber
The following commentary explores the future of urban public finance by focus-
ing on the fiscal ills of New England 's major cities. The impact of general
revenue sharing, categorical grants, federal tax policy, state aid, and own-source
city revenues is assessed in light of a city*s ability to support itself The authors
conclude that a pattern of 'fiscal paternalism"—the past and present policies
for annual financial assistance to narrow the expenditure-revenue budget gap—
must be altered if cities are to enter the twenty-first century as fiscally stable
governments capable of providing the necessary services for a varied constituency.
In 1969, as a candidate for mayor of
New York City, writer Norman Mailer sug-
gested that the most likely method of resolving the City's well-publicized fiscal
problems would be for it to secede from New York State and apply for indepen-
dent statehood status. Mailer reasoned that secession would increase the direct
flow of federal dollars to the City, would eliminate the costs of compliance with
state regulations and the implementation of state-mandated programs, would per-
mit the City to retain 100 percent of the revenues generated within its borders,
and would preclude the potential for suburban legislators, unsympathetic to the
City's needs, to exercise their political power at the expense of the City. On its
face, the proposal seemed somewhat absurd. Yet, twenty years later, it appears
that a number of New England's largest cities might contemplate the same course
of action to obtain the same benefits.
The vision that Mailer's proposal sought to address in 1969 was one of urban
fiscal independence. The prospect of statehood for New York City represented
then what a policy aimed at fiscal independence for New England's cities would
represent now—an end to fiscal paternalism on the part of federal and state
governments toward urban centers.
Fiscal paternalism can be defined as an unhealthy dependence by urban centers
on state and federal financial policies and programs for the purpose of ensuring
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those cities' financial stability. Eliminate state and federal assistance, and New
England's major cities would be burdened by budget deficits that would force a
wholesale redefinition of city government in order for debts to be paid. Reduce
state and federal assistance, as some legislators now contemplate, without an at-
tendant financial plan for the now-dependent cities, and programmatic chaos
should not be unexpected. Like a child who is learning to be independent after
being taught to manage money by application of a parent-supplied weekly
allowance, cities dependent on state and federal allowances must be allotted a
period of transition in order to adjust to the prospects of a future without the
nest of funds that policies of fiscal paternalism have provided.
It is important to understand that this problem did not appear overnight but
rather evolved over two decades to its present point. During the late sixties and
early seventies, cities were the primary beneficiaries of the "Age of
Entitlement"—so named because of the federal policy whereby grants-in-aid were
heaped on almost any jurisdiction regardless of whether they were necessary. All
that was really necessary was a properly filed grant application. In retrospect,
however, the price of these grants was actually quite high, for cities' acceptance
of such monies opened the door to federal interference in local policy planning.
Today, in view of its own soaring deficit, the federal government has pro-
claimed an Age of Fiscal Enlightenment. The federal financial commitment to
cities has been dramatically reduced, and cities face mounting financial pressures.
The process of directing national urban policy away from extravagant provision
for nonessential programs and toward seemingly random cuts in now-essential
services has found cities relinquishing their reins of control over the breadth and
depth of services to be provided. In terms of setting urban priorities, policy has
followed the purse rather than the other way around.
Since the future we frequently define as the year 2000 is only fifteen years
away, it behooves us to consider steps that can be taken by our cities to improve
their prospects for financial independence in the years ahead. Such a review
should begin with a glance at the policies that delineated the parameters of what
we now call fiscal paternalism.
An Overview
From 1960 to 1968, the number of federal grant programs exploded from 45 to
435, without a concomitant explosion of social satisfaction resulting from the ex-
penditures. 1 America had recognized that it was an urban nation with a need to
support the development of its cities. Yet no national urban policy existed. A
paternalistic federal funding policy, referred to as the Great Society, attempted to
solve all ills by throwing money at them. The federal government provided a range
of programs that permitted it to intrude on the management of cities and to
define, in part, the quality of life which cities could afford their residents. Local
officials welcomed an array of programs for the elderly, the disadvantaged, and
the unemployed in large measure because the programs generated political support
from local constituencies without asking local taxpayers to pay the bill directly.
Federal aid accounted for 30 percent of general revenues for cities in the late
fifties; by fiscal 1971 federal aid was responsible for 37 percent of local budgets. 2
Still, one of the most important sources of federal assistance did not appear until
1972. In that year, the general revenue sharing plan, discussed in more detail
later, was introduced. Unlike the categorical grant programs that preceded it,
general revenue sharing was intended to help counteract the expenditure-revenue
imbalance that cities were experiencing by providing unrestricted cash support for
city programs. 3
Unrestricted federal grants to cities totaled $4.6 billion in 1972. In 1985, the
White House determined that it could shave $23.8 billion off the federal deficit
between 1986 and 1990 by eliminating the general revenue sharing program
altogether. 4 Although the federal government apparently found it acceptable to
recommend elimination of the program, mayors and city dwellers alike found
it unusually difficult to accept the cuts because more than ever, general revenue
sharing funds were being used to support essential city services. The federal
effort of 1972, far from reducing the expenditure-revenue imbalance, had cre-
ated an even greater imbalance, masked only by the annual infusion of these
dollars.
Policies of fiscal paternalism advanced unabated throughout the sixties and
seventies. The relationship between the federal government and American cities
became increasingly dependent and structured, providing the former with the op-
portunity to dictate both the breadth and depth of municipal services. This in-
tervention was paternalism at its worst: a veritable intrusion into every City Hall
that either willingly received or was politically pressured into accepting a portion
of the federal largesse. Now, in 1985, cities are witnessing the federal govern-
ment's withdrawal of municipal financial assistance, and they are being left
without an independent means of raising revenues to replace the lost dollars.
The rhetoric of the seventies focused congressional attention on the need to
develop a national urban policy. It appears now that the most prominent
benefits we have to show for those policy efforts are downtown revitalization
projects and their most frequent patrons, center-city Yuppies. After two decades
of undirected urban programs, the future of our cities remains in peril: not from
conflicts within urban centers themselves but from the insidious, undermining ef-
fects of fiscal paternalism. During the twenty-odd years in which there was a
steady flow of revenues from the federal government, city officials were led to
believe that such funds would be forever forthcoming; today, they are learning
that nothing—not even fiscal paternalism—is forever.
The more money urban America accepted from the federal government, the
more federal urbanologists believed their programs were succeeding. But federal
money was only camouflaging some urban ills while it was actually creating
others. None of the federal funds were used to assist cities in planning for a
future independent of federal assistance; instead, federal programs were becom-
ing an integral part of the new menu of urban services, complete with their own
vociferous, dependent constituencies.
In the late 1970s, as federal programs lapsed, state governments were asked to
cover the shortfall lest the momentum of municipal revitalization be stifled.
Fiscal dependence was transferred from federal funds alone to a mix of federal
and state monies. There were now two fiscal parents for cities to look to for
guidance and to depend on for funds.
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General Revenue Sharing
By and large, what revenue sharing tends to do is give a lesser amount of
money in a more politically palatable form.
— Paul N. Ylvisaker, Professor of Education
Former Dean, Harvard Graduate School
of Education
New England's largest cities suffer from many of the problems experienced by
senior citizens who are on fixed incomes and who are dependent on the federal
government for their Social Security checks. These citizens recognize that the na-
tion has a bulging deficit, but they vigorously fight Social Security benefit cut-
backs because they have grown to rely on their no-strings entitlement stipend.
8 What was once a supplemental payment to enhance has now become basic in-
come on which to survive.
The General Revenue Sharing program (GRS), enacted as part of the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, was heralded as a means of resolving the
structural expenditure-revenue imbalance that had begun to plague many of the
nation's older, poorer cities. 5 Ironically, some "neoliberal" Democrats who re-
main staunch defenders of Social Security have sided with the Reagan Adminis-
tration's policy of monetary cutbacks in our cities' Social Security system—that
is, general revenue sharing. Proponents of the cuts argue that the impact on local
fiscal conditions would be moderate, 6 since general revenue sharing represents
less than 2 percent of the total revenues of local governments, but this is not so
for New England's older communities.
Boston, which found itself a scavenger for state aid in order to close a $55
million revenue gap predicted for fiscal 1986, received $18 to $19.5 million an-
nually in revenue sharing monies from 1982 to 1985. 7 Burlington, Vermont, and
Portland, Maine, depend on intergovernmental aid for more than 15 percent of
their operating revenues. After direct state assistance, general revenue sharing
represents the largest single component of these operating budget lifelines. Provi-
dence relies on intergovernmental assistance for more than 25 percent of its bud-
get, while Hartford requires state and federal transfer payments to supply more
than 30 percent of its annual budget. 8
Older cities accepted the advent of general revenue sharing with guarded op-
timism. The optimism was fostered by the belief that revenue sharing funds
would not be accompanied by the programmatic restrictions of categorical aid
and block-grant monies. On the negative side, there was skepticism because rev-
enue sharing represented a net reduction in dollars transferred to cities by the
federal government. New England cities were designating revenue sharing monies
for the staples of government service—police, fire, education—and therefore
were disturbed by the decrease in federal assistance that general revenue sharing
represented.
The federal government's decision in 1981 to eliminate state government par-
ticipation in the revenue sharing program was predicated on the conclusion that
the fiscal condition of state governments no longer warranted federal subsidies. 9
The same can hardly be said of New England's major cities in 1985.
In our view, the federal government accepted certain ''parental" responsibilities
in 1972 when it created the general revenue sharing program, among them the
commitment to nurture cities' use of this money and to create an atmosphere of
fiscal strength at the city level, rather than further the urban addiction to federal
funds. The task of weaning urban America away from the flow of federal funds
cannot be accomplished overnight. While some may see a strategy reminiscent of
triage as an acceptable approach to federal deficit-cutting policies, we do not,
since it means certain regression for older cities that are just beginning to recover
from the burdens of a severe recession, record inflation, and increased pressures
to provide social services for a dependent population of urban poor.
With an eye toward its own goal of deficit reduction, the federal government
should promote a policy of phased reduction in general revenue sharing rather
than one of drastic cuts. In the scenario we envision, phased reduction would:
postpone the termination of the fiscal general revenue sharing grants into the
next decade;
provide grants on a revised need-based formula that would consider: (1) the income
level of the population, (2) the ability of the city to use its own-source revenues,
other than the local property tax, to replace the GRS share of revenues, and (3) the
ability of the state and county governments to provide supplemental assistance
specifically to mitigate the fiscal hardship induced by the elimination of GRS; and
require the dedication of any continued GRS funds for programs that will be ter-
minated when GRS ends unless new revenue sources are developed.
Federal Grants
The Carter Administration had a very good urban policy until it announced it
was going to develop one.
— Richard Nathan
The Brookings Institution
When Richard Nixon was president, the federal share of city government rev-
enues was 5 percent. By 1978, midway through the Carter Administration and
before President Carter enacted his new national urban policy, the federal share
of city government revenues reached its peak at 15 percent. 10 It is little wonder
that urban leaders preferred the earlier Carter urban aid flow to the more bureau-
cratic grantsmanship policies of Carter's New Partnership national urban policy.
Despite Carter's best efforts, the New Partnership represented more paperwork,
more politics, fewer projects, and less cash.
A brief review of how the use of federal funds shaped the urban fiscal land-
scape illustrates why the proposed reductions in federal grants in the fiscal 1986
budget will be certain to cause service disruptions and disorganization in the ur-
ban financial planning process. Federal aid to state and local governments, which
was less than $1 billion in the early 1940s, grew to $7 billion by 1960, $23 billion
by 1970, and more than $96 billion by 1981. 11 As the dollars grew, so did the
programs through which they were funneled. Barely a dozen programs in the
mid-forties swelled to nearly 200 by the mid-sixties and then doubled to more
than 400 by 1970. 12
Not only was federal domestic spending growing, but so was the federal gov-
ernment's direct involvement in local government affairs. The federal government
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was responsible for providing funds and operating guidelines for the War on
Poverty, Model Cities, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Urban
Mass Transit Administration, and the Urban Development Action Grants, as well
as for coalescing constituencies for each of these programs. These constituencies,
which evolved into sources of urban electoral power, first developed a taste for
the money, then an expectation of more money, and, finally, a dependence on
every dollar received.
The massive infusion of federal money created almost as many problems as it
solved. Federal grants for capital projects were frequently biased in favor of new
construction. As a result, some local priorities were deferred in favor of projects
that were targeted for federal support. From 1957 to 1977, as the federal share of
capital project funding increased from 10 to 40 percent of total project costs, the
10 existing infrastructure—roads, bridges, water and sewer systems, and public
buildings—eroded, owing to a lack of funding for repair and replacement of con-
structed projects. By 1979, as policymakers began to focus their attention on the
need for maintenance of the existing infrastructure, federal funding for these
local projects had begun to decline in response to federal budgetary pressures. 13
Even the Final Report of the Urban and Regional Policy Group, chaired by
then Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Patricia Roberts Harris, com-
mented on the serious shortcomings of federal urban aid programs:
Programs have evolved in a piecemeal fashion, causing problems of administration
and coordination. While efforts at funding innovative programs like urban
renewal have helped cities redevelop deteriorated areas, they have also ended up
deteriorating more low-income housing than they have replaced. . . . They have
weakened the neighborhoods and encouraged suburban sprawl. . . . The Federal
Government has supported the development of industry outside the central cities
while funding training programs in the central cities for jobs that did not exist. 14
Though the report was intended to serve as a framework for the New Partner-
ship subsequently proposed by President Carter, it is questionable whether the
administration fully appreciated the report's significance. The administration
should have concluded from it that local governments needed to strengthen their
independent capacities to accurately determine their own project priorities and to
establish the means of funding their desired projects and programs. Instead, the
president's speech announcing the new urban policy demonstrated the administra-
tion's deduction that further federal intervention in local priority-setting was not
only desirable, but actually required:
During this period, the early 1970s, the Federal government retreated from its
responsibilities, leaving states and localities with insufficient resources, interest
or leadership to accomplish all that needed to be done. We learned that states
and localities cannot solve the problems by themselves. . . . These experiences
taught us that a successful urban policy must build a partnership that involves
the leadership of the Federal government and the participation of all levels of
governments, the private sector, neighborhood and voluntary organizations
and individual citizens. 15
The New Federalism of the Reagan Administration, which followed on the heels
of Carter's lackluster urban effort, took a dramatically different course. Instead of
continuing the policy of interposing the federal government in local affairs, it
enacted programmatic reductions that resulted in a loss of 13.3 percent of federal
aid in a single year to cities with populations of more than 250,000. The Urban
Institute estimated that the policy of New Federalism, if fully implemented,
would mean that the federal government's share of state and local budgets would
be reduced from 25 percent in 1984 to 4 percent by 1997. 16
This feast-to-famine cycle of federal funding for urban America does not pro-
vide the basis for a sound policy of urban fiscal independence. For those New
England cities that had made especially good use of federal grants to spur the
revitalization of downtown areas, the reversal in federal funding policies repre-
sents a particular hardship. In fact, the reduction of funds for Urban Develop-
ment Action Grants (UDAGs) will especially affect New England, because this
region of the country has established an exceptionally broad-based success record
as a result of UDAG projects. 11
In Boston alone, UDAG funds of more than $60 million have spurred develop-
ment of some twenty projects since 1978, while Community Development Block
Grants (CDBGs) provided an average of $28.3 million per year between 1976 and
1980 and have been providing about $22 million per year since then. Portland,
Maine, has also utilized UDAG and CDBG funds creatively to help finance the
revitalization of its central business district. Private capital to support the devel-
opment of the important waterfront area and the redevelopment of the major
Bath Iron Works facility was obtained as a result of the seed monies made avail-
able by the selective use of these federal programs to match city-selected priori-
ties. Providence is another city with a successful, major downtown redevelopment
program, the Capital Center Project, which plans to relocate the city's train sta-
tion in order to free approximately thirty-two acres for commercial real estate
development. 17 Like Boston and Portland, Providence has made excellent use of its
federal grant monies to elicit private participation in public capital projects that
otherwise would have had great difficulty meeting start-up cost requirements.
Based on the many media accounts of groundbreaking ceremonies for federally
funded downtown development sites, the employment benefits of these grant pro-
grams are quite significant. (In fact, quantifying job-generation potential is a
standard requirement on federal grant applications.) Although less easily quanti-
fied, the positive impact on local economic development from Urban Mass Transit
Authority improvement monies and Environmental Protection Agency technical
assistance funds is no less important. Federal grant programs have been responsible
not only for original projects but also for the amelioration of already existing
facilities. Thus, by improving the general quality of life in urban centers, the pro-
grams have increased their ability to attract both new and expanding businesses.
The decision of the Reagan Administration greatly to restrict the allocation of
monies for future development projects will retard but not irreparably cripple the
development process. However, the reduction in grants for development projects
already beyond the planning process stage may be responsible for the reversal of
the most positive economic development trends that these cities have witnessed
since the outset of the federal grant programs. The administration's recent will-
ingness to create "enterprise zones" as examples of an urban assistance program
designed to replace the direct funding of priority projects is admirable, but this
mechanism will not provide sufficient assistance for cities trying to sustain their
urban economic recovery.
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What Cities Can Do
Having reviewed the history and current status of federal grants, we can now
turn our attention to an assessment of what New England's major cities can do
to foster their transition to fiscal stability and independence by the year 2000.
Based on Congress's approach to the fiscal 1986 budget, it is clear that the fed-
eral government's past role in urban economic development will be altered in
response to the national priority of federal budget cutting. New England cities,
therefore, should consider amending their own financial planning processes to
reflect a newfound awareness of the federal government's eroding commitment to
its older cities:
Cities should not continue to apply for federal grants that mandate levels
ofprogrammatic service the total annual costs for which cannot be provided in
the year the grant is received. In short, older cities cannot afford to accept
federal money if they cannot go along with the federal strings that accompany it.
Cities should assume that henceforth seed money will be just that and follow-up
funds for continuation of programs will not be awarded.
Cities should not apply for federal grants that require matching monies unless
these monies can be placed on reserve at the time the grant applications are sub-
mitted. Older cities cannot afford to continue seeking federal money like the
already debt-burdened bargain hunter who makes unnecessary purchases merely
because an attractive discount is available.
Cities must refocus the efforts of their national lobbying organizations, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cities. The request for future
federal funds should be restricted to development monies that will provide lever-
age to obtain private capital, and should not include programmatic funds that
eventually will place a further drain on municipal treasuries. Through their lobby-
ing activities, older cities in particular must assert publicly that federal intrusions
into municipal priority-setting are at an end because the flow of federal funds is
at its end.
In the coming decade, cities should use the federal grants system to acquire the
tools they will need for their economic independence instead of merely seeking a
continuation of funding for the programs that fostered the fiscal paternalism
responsible for bigger municipal deficits.
Federal Tax Policy
Two specific elements of federal tax policy have had a significant impact on the
ability of city governments to provide for themselves. The first element is the
provision allowing municipal governments to raise funds by soliciting monies
from capital markets on a tax-exempt basis. The second element is the directive
preventing municipal governments from raising funds by taxing property owned
by education institutions, hospitals, churches, and state and federal governments.
The use of tax-exempt debt by municipalities has increased sevenfold since
1959. 18 Access to the capital markets has been a positive source of assistance to
municipal governments seeking long-term funds for new projects or short-term
funds to ease cash-flow burdens. Big-city mayors have also recognized the use-
fulness of private-purpose tax-exempt bonds as tools to aid economic develop-
ment and to promote industrial diversification. As the Advisory Committee on
Intergovernmental Relations recently commented, "The use of tax-exempt bonds
for economic development becomes increasingly important ... as federal grants
are cut back and officials are hard put to find economic incentives to lure in-
dustries to their areas." 19
With the federal government moving ahead in its deficit-cutting efforts, in-
creased attention has been paid to the drain on the federal Treasury caused by
the record level of long-term debt—surpassing $90 billion in 1983—that has been
issued. In their efforts to reduce the overall volume of debt, federal policymakers
have attempted to redefine the purposes for which tax-exempt debt may be
issued. 20 If changes restricting tax-exempt debt are enacted by the Congress, debt- 13
spurred economic development of convention centers, retail areas, resource
recovery plants, warehouse expansions, private educational facilities, port authori-
ties, airports, and public housing may be adversely affected. The tax reforms of
1984 have already begun to curtail local plans for repairs to and expansion of a
number of job-generating capital projects: state governments and public authorities
have been limited in the issuance of industrial development bonds to a predeter-
mined annual allocation of tax-exempt debt, based on a per-capita formula.
While the federal government is restricting the access of municipalities to tax-
exempt capital markets, it is doing nothing to restrict the expansion of public
educational facilities, hospitals, and state and federal government buildings
within New England's major cities. Though the new construction may tempo-
rarily add workers to employment rolls, it permanently removes real estate
parcels of significant value from the property tax rolls, which further aggravates
an already existing problem. In Boston, where 47 percent of all property remains
entirely untaxed, there is the largest proportion of tax-exempt property in any
major U.S. city other than in Washington, D.C. 21 Hartford suffers not only
because 36 percent of its property is tax-exempt but also because this commit-
ment of property in preferred locations restricts the physical space available for
further commercial development capable of generating substantial property tax
revenues. 22
One of the remedies for this problem that is acceptable to state and municipal
governments is the use of PILOTS—Payment in Lieu of Taxes—by tax-exempt
institutions. These negotiated payments are clearly not the equivalent of a prop-
erty tax payment, which by its very nature grows as the wealth of the land and its
appurtenances increases. Nevertheless, PILOTS provide one avenue to ease the
burden of tax-exempt properties.
Federal tax policy has been utilized for years to provide indirect subsidies for
special interest groups or to encourage development in sectors of the economy
that otherwise would not expand, owing to the lack of monies required for start-
up activities. Previously, much of the tax aid provided was concentrated on
assisting business growth focused primarily on new development and on the Sun
Belt area. Both the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation for new in-
dustrial or commercial plants encouraged investments in new structures and in
growing areas, rather than in the older, more settled cities of New England. 23
Now that the initial exodus from the Northeast to the Sun Belt has taken place, it
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is critical for New England cities to utilize every economic development tool
available to encourage existing business expansion and the spawning of new com-
panies through venture capital operations, thereby creating new jobs.
There are several aspects of pending federal tax reform legislation that cities
must aggressively fight if they do not want to risk losing some badly needed
financial opportunities:
Cities must lobby in opposition to those tax simplification proposals that would
eliminate the federal income tax deduction for state and local taxes. Though such
tax law change would save almost $30 billion for the U.S. Treasury, it would be
doing so at the direct expense of municipal governments already hurt by previ-
ously mentioned cutbacks of federal aid.
14 Cities must lobby to prevent tax reform proposals from further restricting the
volume of tax-exempt revenue bonds. With estimates for the cost of required
upgrades of municipal water and sewerage systems by the year 1990 exceeding
$90 billion, municipalities can hardly afford to increase their cost of borrowing
to improve these systems. 24
Cities must begin to lobby for the extension of legislation that permits the is-
suance of tax-exempt debt to subsidize single- and multifamily housing develop-
ment. Making center city housing affordable is as important to attracting young
families to the city as any element of a sound urban plan for the future.
State Aid
Just as the twig is bent, the tree's inclined.
— Alexander Pope, Moral Essays
Despite what some state legislators may think, no big-city mayor enjoys the an-
nual ritual of going to the state capital, hat in hand, to pander for state aid. This
process is frequently accompanied by stern lectures from suburban legislators on
how increased state assistance would not be necessary if urban governments
would control their profligate spending habits.
It is a myth of public finance that New England's major cities need more state
aid because they cannot control their expenditures. It is a fact, though, that in-
creased state aid is required almost annually because city governments in New
England cannot control their own means of revenue generation. For example,
Boston's economic resurgence has been good for its business leaders but of little
help to its government. At times when the state prospers, Boston may receive a
share of its newfound largesse, but a disproportionately small share. Yet when
state growth is limited, Boston is in trouble. The reason is simple: with only the
local property tax to rely on and with an overabundance of tax-exempt proper-
ties, Boston must look to Massachusetts to pay for an ever-increasing percentage
of city services. Boston claims that it generates about $1.1 billion in state rev-
enues; yet it receives only 21 percent of that amount in direct state assistance. 25
In fiscal 1985, state aid represented 34.8 percent of all Boston revenues. In the
same year, Connecticut's assistance represented 37 percent of Hartford's revenues.
Both cities are state capitals, both serve as the economic growth centers for their
states, and both are annually dependent on their state governments to define the
parameters of service and the potential for excellence in their municipal govern-
ments. For both cities, the success of the appeal for funds to the state legislature
is more likely to be a measure of mayoral job performance than of either the
municipal economy or the municipal budget. "Good" mayors are those who get
along well with powerful state leaders. Whether such mayors are strong in per-
sonal leadership or adroit as personnel managers or creative as program engineers
becomes quite secondary, and it is easy to see that this is not the most efficient
way to run a government. A mayor of a major New England city in 1985 should
be judged on more than the lobbying skills required to garner sufficient state aid
once again to temporarily bridge the gap between expenditures and revenues.
If cities are to remain viable as governmental entities providing services and
policy direction for their constituencies, they need to have the fiscal independence
which only a diversified revenue base can provide. As author Ray Bahl has ob- 75
served, "City governments could argue that state governments regulate their
fiscal decisions and constrain their fiscal options." 26 To alter that present-day
scenario, city governments should:
seek independent revenue-generating powers in lieu of additional state aid;
dedicate state aid to specific categories of services, such as police, fire, and snow
removal, in order to develop a more clearly articulated public argument for more
money; and
seek to increase the PILOTS made by state government for tax-exempt state
properties owned within the city's limits.
Property Taxes
In terms of public finance, New England's major cities share one glaring weak-
ness: a revenue base that is far too dependent on the local property tax. This
overdependence is particularly problematical in New England because the prop-
erty tax does not respond well to economic growth in older cities, 27 given the
limited areas available for new construction and for extensive expansions. Addi-
tionally, the property tax is regressive and places a disproportionate share of the
burden of central city costs on the working poor residents of the city. As a result,
increased levels of city services that are paid for by local property taxes effec-
tively represent a transfer of real income from the lower- to the middle-income
population of a city. 28
For example, in Boston the property tax represents 37.6 percent of the city's
total revenues. State and federal subsidies aside, the property tax provides more
than 90 percent of all city-derived revenues. At the onset of Proposition 2Vi,
Boston was collecting $518 million annually in property tax payments, an amount
which dropped by some 30 percent, to $363 million, only four years later.
In Burlington, Vermont, 68.2 percent of all city-based revenues are derived
from the property tax. Manchester, New Hampshire, similarly receives 69.6 per-
cent of its revenues from the property tax, and Portland, Maine, receives 73.3
percent. Portland has taken a number of steps to reduce government personnel
levels and to develop sewerage system, airport, and port facility revenues, thereby
beginning the process of reducing the city's dependence on the property tax. 29
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During the early 1980s, reliance on property tax was a chief factor contribut-
ing to the financial problems that beset several New England cities. In 1982, with
62.5 percent of city revenues coming from the tax, Providence could not adjust
its expenditure pattern to a 10 percent delinquency rate in collection of the tax. 30
In 1981 the property tax provided 58.1 percent of all revenues in Hartford, but
with 36 percent of that city's property being tax-exempt, it was estimated that
about $41 million in potential revenues from property taxes was lost. 31
A number of New England's larger cities have been enjoying a building boom
of late that has helped to increase the property tax base without penalizing cen-
tral city residents. As that period of new construction and redevelopment sub-
sides, greater attention must be focused on how to expand the tax base without
creating disincentives for business growth or more roadblocks to home owner-
16 ship. Regardless of the quality of city services or the reputation of a city's school
system, property taxes can create economic barriers for young families wishing to
enter a neighborhood.
Mayoral plans or state government directives for city assessors to conduct
comprehensive revaluation efforts do not solve the property tax problem. Such
actions merely affirm that the existing tax, no matter how burdensome, will be
apportioned more equitably. Recommendations to enact city sales taxes or in-
come taxes for city commuters have been analyzed correctly as disincentives for
business growth. The potential for regional income or sales taxes, however, has
not been comprehensively reviewed.
While a localized commuter income tax could encourage business to relocate
to suburban office park sites where feasible, a regional commuter income tax
surcharge would incorporate both the central city and the suburban business loca-
tions. The tax would be set and collected by the state. The proceeds would be used
to pay for the state's assumption of central city costs peculiar to the operation of
the downtown area, that is, transportation, police, fire, and redevelopment-
agency overhead expenses. By allocating business district costs to an employment-
related tax—that is, by instituting a commuter income tax surcharge—cities
would be able to apportion the cost of neighborhood operations to residents
through their property taxes. The property tax would then be returned to its role
as the primary tax to support city services for city residents, in lieu of the current
requirement that it pay not only for neighborhood residents' service costs but
also for those of the city's visitors, businesses, and nonresident business
employees.
User Fees and Other Revenue Sources
// appears unlikely that user charges can play a major role in the fiscal
rejuvenation of the central cities.
— Colin C. Blaydon and Steven R. Gilford
"Financing the Cities: An Issue Agenda, 1977," in
Municipal Finance: The Duke Law Journal Symposium
Violators can now pay their City of Boston parking tickets by using Visa or Mas-
terCard, which shows that New England's largest city is taking imaginative and
even extreme steps to capture every available dollar of nontax revenues. While
almost 13 percent of city revenues in 1957 were raised from user charges, by 1975
only 18 percent of these revenues were derived from this source, 32 reflecting the
comparatively limited growth in this area of taxation. While transportation,
water, sewer, and inspectional services, along with the costs of document produc-
tion, can be passed on directly to the service-recipient public, the city's most costly
services—education, fire, and police—cannot be budgeted as successfully on a
user-charge basis. Consequently, though user charges can help fill city revenue
coffers, they really cannot be relied on to close major revenue gaps caused by in-
creasing personnel costs for essential city services. In fact, licenses and fees,
because of their regressive nature, are usually restricted to the amount required to
repay government for the cost of their administration and collection. The urban
centers of New England, already home to a disproportionate number of the poor,
would not be assisting their own tax-paying constituencies by further taxing them 17
in this fashion. Taxes on services rather than on wealth are not an answer to ur-
ban ills; they are merely a reminder to all city residents that every segment of the
population is being called upon to support city services.
The politics of revenue generation become most difficult when small, incre-
mental fees and charges are levied on the average city resident instead of on
corporations doing business in the city or on suburban residents utilizing the
city as a center for education, entertainment, health care, and employment op-
portunity.
In fiscal 1985, Boston's user fees provided 4.4 percent of its total revenues,
while in Hartford they provided 5 percent of revenues in the same year. 33 Given
the determined efforts of both cities with regard to user fees, it would appear
that no matter how successfully these taxes are selected for application and then
collected, they will never amount to a sum sufficient to pay for the most signifi-
cant costs of government operation.
While New England cities should be vigilant in their pursuit of user-fee rev-
enues, each one of them should conduct an updated evaluation of the potential
for enhancing this source of revenue. Instead of focusing on user fees, major
cities should direct their efforts toward per-capita taxes that can be exported to
those visitors to the city or to business-district employees who, while they benefit
from the quality of city services, are not required to pay for the cost of these
services when they return to their own state or suburban bedroom community.
These export taxes would include surcharges on entertainment and sporting
events, student dormitory occupancy, parking spaces, hotel-motel occupancy,
hospital bed occupancy, and airport departure fees. Since taxes and fees of this
sort, unlike traditionally defined user fees, could generate revenues from a
mostly nonresident tax-paying public, they would create more politically palat-
able sources of financial independence, as well as fiscally more rewarding ones.
Looking to the Future
It was the inability to grasp the totality that permitted officials to walk straight
ahead, eyes wide open, and plunge directly off the financial cliffs.
— Charles R. Morris, describing the circumstances
surrounding the 1975 default by New York City in
The Cost of Good Intentions
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Most people are still able to fantasize about the possibilities for an enhanced qual-
ity of life in the year 2000, but city governments look to the future with an abiding
sense of insecurity as to the role cities will be able to play in the system of gover-
nance. Under the present municipal finance structure, which requires cities to look
to higher-tier governments to direct their mandates, coalesce their constituencies,
and foot their bills, the best urban New England can hope for is the status quo.
Our premise is simple: the status quo does not provide an acceptable urban
policy course for the future. Policies of fiscal paternalism must not be allowed to
continue unabated and unchallenged. Urban financial planning must replace ur-
ban grantsmanship in defining the programs that cities can provide to their
residents. Own-source city revenues must grow as urban economies improve. City
residents should be able to garner the financial support of suburban residents
18 who derive benefits from the economic vitality of urban commercial centers. City
residents should be expected to bear the fiscal burdens of their own neighbor-
hoods, but they should not be asked to pay for the maintenance and development
of the widely utilized downtown areas.
Cities must assess the effect of current fiscal policies on their ability to deter-
mine their course outside the policy initiatives of the White House or the State
House. Only through such realistic appraisal can they plan adequately for the
future. Having made such appraisals, cities could take the following steps toward
assuring their financial independence for the future.
Create New Revenue Sources
For revenue diversification to be successful, sources for funds must meet certain
criteria beyond the ability initially to provide enough monies.
Collection of the revenue source must lend itself to easy administration with a
low rate of default and at a cost that allows a net revenue yield of sufficient size.
The new source must have growth potential that will enable it to augment in
response to positive economic trends. It must also have a formula or a taxpayer
group that can be varied, in either case enabling the revenue yield to increase
during times of economic downturn.
Finally, the public must find the tax acceptable, despite its reticence to support
any tax increase. The revenue source must equally affect taxpayers who are
receiving an equivalent service or who own property of equal value. Efficiency,
expandability, equity, and acceptability are the elements that are key to a revenue
program's success in satisfying political requirements the day it is enacted and in
fulfilling public finance requirements decades later. 34
Redefine Municipal Services
Given the financial limitations that cities face, city governments must work to
redefine what business they should be in and what segments of the population
they should be certain to serve. The financing and delivery of public services
should be reevaluated with an eye toward shifting duplicative, unnecessary, or
too broadly defined functions to a higher tier of government, if necessary. 35
Cities must look to the formation of regional service districts to provide ser-
vices such as transportation, resource recovery, water and sewer maintenance,
and port and airport operations, all of which benefit a general user community
that is larger than the city's own resident population. Further, cities should not
be reluctant to assess property in the downtown or central business district or to
implement a property tax surcharge that would cover the expense of providing
costly fire services to high-rise buildings, repairs to frequently traveled streets in
retail districts or warehouse areas, and police services for visiting dignitaries, con-
ventions, sports events, and other public gatherings.
Lobby for State Assumption of Costs
By providing annual formula-based financial assistance to cities, state govern-
ments do not help to break the pattern of fiscal paternalism that seems endlessly
to require more aid. By contrast, when state governments, as part of an accepted
redefinition of municipal services, permanently assume the costs of programs cur-
rently provided by cities, they are creating a path for financial stability and in-
dependence that cities may follow. 19
Why should the cost of correctional facilities be borne by cities instead of by
state governments, which enact the criminal laws and operate the courts? Why
should the cost of educational services be borne by cities and not by state govern-
ments, when minimum standards of proficiency are established by state depart-
ments of education and requirements for special programming are imposed by
state and federal courts? Why should the cost of publicly subsidized housing be
borne by cities, when state governments have greater access to the tax-exempt
capital markets for housing revenue bonds? Why should the cost of social ser-
vices for the elderly, the handicapped, and the poor be borne by cities, when
standards for service and minimum support are established by the federal Con-
stitution or by federal or state legislation? Cities could better cope with the cost
of services particular to their own municipalities if state governments would
assume the cost for these areas of service, rather than merely provide annual sub-
sidies. As authors Colin Blaydon and Steve Gilford have observed:
Whatever course of action is ultimately selected, it seems clear that the states must
assume a more active role in maintaining the financial strength of America's cities.
The recent period of increasing federal responsibility for financing the cities has
come to a close, and the problems of financing municipal services can no longer
be left to local officials. A new era of vigorous state action is now required. 36
Proceed with Politically Imperfect Proposals
However we define the causes of the existing problem, the solutions all require
taxes. Those who are using but not paying for a city's services today will be
asked to pay for them tomorrow. Such a concept, no matter how gracefully ar-
ticulated, carefully presented, or skillfully politicked, will not meet with the
grateful approval of the electorate. Suburban voters do not view themselves as
direct beneficiaries of central city services, and it is not surprising that they do
not want to pay for that which they feel they do not receive. Urban politicians,
whose opportunity to obtain higher office may depend on suburban votes, are
not quick to alienate their constituents.
For years, the ritual dance for dollars performed by big-city mayors before
state house audiences has been a carefully orchestrated plea for help at the bud-
getary breaking point. Dialogue about establishing urban financial independence
has been lacking without the klieg lights that accompany a crisis. It is vital that
proposals, though politically imperfect, be offered well in advance of the time
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when solutions are required. Consensus building is a painstaking, arduous, educa-
tional process. It will take years, not several meetings or several months, to reac-
quaint suburban taxpayers with the sense that they do in fact derive direct
benefits from their central cities and therefore have responsibilities to them.
New England's cities need a new direction for the management of their inter-
governmental financial relationships. They need an opportunity to manage the
programs for which they should be held responsible without being burdened by
additional mandates and without being denied the state and federal benefits on
which they have been led to rely. In anticipation of the year 2000, city govern-
ments—in partnership with their states—should begin to define the role they will
play in the twenty-first century and to determine how their responsibilities will be
financed. New England, as a region, does not need a national urban policy. New
20 England's cities do need to shape a new urban policy for themselves. In recogni-
tion of how long it took for that policy to evolve to its present state, the task of
redefining it should begin today. As McGee's First Law states in The Book of
Murphy's Laws, "It's amazing how long it takes to complete something you are
not working on."
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